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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ARNELL H. WELCHMAN and EVA

B. WELCHMAN,
Plaintiffs and App,ellants,

vs.

Case No.

8718
MERRILL J. WOOD, djbja Wood
Realty Company, and MILO D.
CARTER,
D,efendants and Respondents.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

PRELIMINARY

STATE~MENT

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' action for damages for breach of contract
or, in the alternative, for restitution of a comm1ssion paid
to defendants by plaintiffs.
1
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It was felt appropriate, in connection with the review
of a summary judgme·nt, to bring up the entire record.
T·hroughout this brief, R indicates pages ·of the record,
and D ~pages of the deposition published herein (R. 18).
Italicized emphasis throughout this brief :has be,en added
by appellants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs had a pressing need for money, in order
to pay debts. They decided to sell their house to raise
it (D. 34, 35). Accordingly, they entered into a written
listing agreement with defendant \Vood on March 8,
1956 (D. 4; R. 31). This listing agreement did notrequire ,a trade of properties. It provided, in handwriting,
"Will exchange for money,·~ and in the fine print on the
reverse side was the provision, ". . . If I agree to an
exchange of said property, . . . '' ( R. 31).
Wood assigned his salesman, defendant Carter, to
seek a buyer (R. 9 ~ D. 15). Defendants did not present
plaintiffs 'vith any offer until April 28, 1956. On that
day Carter came to plaintiffs with an offer from a couple
by tlie nrune of Granger to exchange their residence
valued at $10,000 for plaintiffs residence valued at $21,000, with the balance, after adjusting equities~ to be paid
to plaintiffs by Granger's in n1onthly installments, under
a real estate contract (D. 14, 9).
Plaintiffs were a:t first unwilling to accept Granger's
offer because it 'vould not produce the cash that they
sorely needed (R. 1: D. 14, 27, 32). Carter assured them
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that they \vould obtain sufficient oash from the transaction because defendant~s could make available to them
$8,600 under an F.H.A. loan on the Granger house, which
·would result in almost $3,500 net cash for plaintiffs,
and defendants could sell their proposed real estate contract with Granger's for at le~ast $4,000 cash (R. 1; D. 14,
15, 16, 26, 27, 35, 36). Plaintiffs express-ed concern that
defendants might not be able to make available these
sums, but Carter assured them that there was nothing
to worry about. He discussed the matter with Wood over
the phone and p:romised them that these amounts would
be forthcoming (R. 1; D. 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 36, 37).
Solely in reliance upon Carter's representations
and promises, and in consideration thereof, plaintiffs
agreed with defendants to make the trade with Granger's
(R. 1; D. 9, 14, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39). D,efendants thereby
became entitled to receive a commission of $1,050 from
plaintif:Ds ;plus an additional commission of almost $500
from Granger's, none of which they would have been
entitled to otherwise unless they had produced a buyer
\Vho would "·exchange for rnoney" (R. 1, 31; D. 10, 11,
37). Plaintiffs acting in reliance upon this oral modification completed the transaction with Granger's and
subsequently paid the commission to defendants, so thrat
plaintiffs fully performed everything that they agreed
to perform under the new agreement (R. 2; D. 10, 11,

12, 32, 37, 39, 42, 43). By completing the trade with the
third party, Granger's, plaintiffs materially and irrevocably changed their position.
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Defendants failed to make available to plaintiffs
any F.H.A. financing, because ·of a substantial defect
in the roundation of the house (Granger's) to be financed,
and failed to sell the Granger contract for $4,000, becaus~e no one would buy it at that price (R. 2; D. 30, 17,
19, 37)~ Plaintiffs subsequently suffered direct and
proximate dam·ages as a result (R. 2, 3; D. 20-24, 31,
38, 39).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The pleadings, deposition, exhibit and affidavit on
file show .that there are genuine issues as to material
facts and that defendants are not entitled to jud~ent,
dismis~sing the action, as a matter of l·aw.
ARGUMENT
The principal question involved in this case comes
down to this: Can defendants induce plaintiffs to follow
a particular course of action, expressly assume the risk
of an unsatisfactory result, reap a \vindfall thereby, and
then, when what they have promised fails to result and
plaintiffs are left without the agreed recompense, hide
behind the ·claim that the transaction imposes no enforceable obligations upon them?
The district court entered sununary judgment, on
motion of defendants, on defendants~ theory· that plaintiffs are not e11titled to damages for th·e breach of an
alleged oral contract, Pither because no such contract
had be,en made or because, in any eyent it is barred by
the statute of frauds.
4
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A motion for sunrmary judgment pierces the pleadings; ~he formal issues presented by the pleadings are
not controlling .and the court must consider the entire
setting of the case and all pap·ers of record. Barron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, (Rules Edition), 3:89, §1236, (·citing numerous authorities). Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which the courts are,
and should be, reluctant to usie. Holland vs. Columbia
Iron Mining ·Comparny, 4 Utah 2d 303; 293 P2d 700, 705
(.concurring opinion); Travelers Indemnity vs. Mcintosh,
112 Cal App 2d 177, 245 P2d 1065 1068. In reviewing a
summary judgment, the party against whom it was
granted is entitled to have the court consider the evidence and every fair inference fairly arising therefrom
in the light most favorable to him. Morris ·vs. Farnsworth Motel, ____ Utah ____ ; 259 P2d 297, 298; Holland vs.
Columbia I·ron Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303; 293 P2d 700,
703 (concurring opinion); Strauss VB. Strauss, 90 Cal
App 2d 757, 203 P2d 857, 858.
A. A NEW, ORALLY MODIFIED, CONTRACT WAS
ENTERED INTO SUBSEQUENT TO THE WRITTEN ONE ...

Was a new contract entered into by the parties on
April 28, 1956, which modified and, to the extent of :such
modification, replaced ifue original written ·contract of
March 8, 1956 ~
The factual situation is presented supra. It should
be stressed that under the fonner written listing agre·ement, plaintiffs had no obligation, whatsoever, to contract for an exchange of p~roperties with any buyer pro-

;
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duced by defendants. That agreement provided on its
face, ''Will exchange for money'' (R. 31), the. word
"money" having been handwritten. The fin:e ~print on
the reverse of said listing card specified " ... If I agree
to an exchange ·of s:aid property . . . '' Even if the
written and printed provisions can be considered to be
inconsistent, it is well established that, in such case, the
handwriting must prev·ail. 12 Am. Jur. 797, §253. The
verbal modification of April 28th has all the essential
elements of contract, as is fully evident in the deposition
of plaintiff Arn;ell H. Welchman (D. 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 26,
27, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39). But it fails to meet the requirement of the statute that it be in writing.
B. THE NEW CONTRACT CONFERRED ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS UPON PLAINTIFFS, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

Does such new agreement, consisting of the original
written agreement together with the verbal modifioo.-·
tions thereof, confer ·any legal rights upon plaintiffs,
notwithstanding the s·tatute of frauds~
Art 12 Am. Jur. 1006, §428, it is stated:

"It is true that a simple contract co1npletely
reduce·d to writing cannot be contradicted,
changed, or n1odified by parol evidence of what
was s.aid ~and done by th·e parties to it at the time
iJt w·as Inade, because the parties agreed to put the
contract in 'vriting and to n1ake the writing part
.and eovidenee thereof. The very purpose of the
writing is to render the agreement more certain
and to exclude parol eviden.ce of it. Neverthe-
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less, by the rules of the eommon law, it is competent for the partie1s to a simple contract in
writing, befor~e any breach of its provisions, altogether to waive, dissolve, or abandon it, or to
add to, change, or modify it, OT Viary or qualify
its terms, and thus make it a new one. In the
latter case the contract must be proved partly by
the written and partly by the subsequent oral contract which has thus been incorporated into, and
made part of, the original one. The reason f:or
this seems to be that simple contracts, whethe-r
\vritten or otherwis·e, are, in the absence of a
statute changing the rule, of the same dignity in
.contemplation of lavv, and therefore the written
contract may be changed, modified or waived in
\Vhole or in p~art by a subsequent one, ~express or
. 1"1ed . . . "
1mp
1. ALL PROVISIONS WITHIN THE STATUTE WERE
FULLY EXECUTED.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is generally true
that a contract required by the statute of frauds to be
in \Vriting cannot he modified by :parol. But there is
a well recognized exception to this where the oral modification has been acted upon. At 49 Am. Jur. 61)', ~306,
it is stated:
''Accordingly, in many cases where the agreement as m·odified has been acted upon, the rights
of the parties have been held to be determined by
the modified .agreement. This is especially true
if -tjhere has been what amounts to a part per~ormance, or if both parties have governed themselves by the modified agreement. These courts,
while recognizing the gene~ral principle that an
agreement requi~red by· the statute of frauds to
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be in writing may not be substantially altered by
an Ol}al·agreement, take the position that parties
may not accept the benefits from such alteration
and then claim that the transaction is void.
''It is said that it cannot be objected that the
modification of a written lease within the statute
of frauds W•as by pa:rol, after the modified contract has heen executed. Under this rule, a party
may defend an action brought against him for
breach of the written agreement by ·showing per·
f.ormance in accordance with the terms of the oral
modification; or the party who has performed
according to the aral agr.eement may recover ac.
cording to the terms of the oral agreement, or
main.tain an action in damages for non-performance on the part of the other party, . . .''
"As to what brings a case within the operation of the rule th.at an oral modification acted
upon is valid, or at least gives rise to enforceable
obligations, depends largely upon the facts of
the individu.al case. It may be stated generally
that the acts reli-ed upon by the party seeking relief •on the or.al modification must have been taken
by virtue of the oral contract, and under and in
pursuance of it . . . ''
T·he Utah statute of frauds, ordinarily applicable,
is U.C.A., 1953, 25-5-4:
''In the follo\ving cases every agreement shall
be void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandun1 thereof, is in ,,~riting subscribed by
illie party to be charged therewi tl1 :

"
'' ( 5) EYery agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell
real estnte f~or ·COinpens.ation. ''

8
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This statute was construed in K,err vs. Hillyard, 51
Utah 364, 170 P. 981, in \Yhich defendant real estate
broke r ,,~as employed by :plaintiff ·as plaintiff's agent
to purchase a farm and certain personal pToperty from
one Bowm~an. The parties agreed orally that defendant
\Yas to receive as compensation for his services one-half
of the personal property, not exceeding $300 in value.
Defendant pr.oceeded to negotiate with Bowman and
su0ceeded in making 1Jhe purchase, obtaining the reby,
in addition to the farn1, personal property of the· value
of $850. D·ef:endant failed to remit the excess over $300
to plaintiff, in accordance with the verbal agreement,
and claimed that such agreement was void, because oral,
under Comp. Laws 1907, §2467, subdiv. 5, as amended by
chapter 72, La\vs Utah 1909, eommonly known as the
statute of frauds, which statute is identical with U.C.A.,
1953, 25-5-4, supra. This eourt held, ~at 170 P. 982:
1

1

''In our opinion the statute relied on has no
application here. It is true that the de£endant was
employed by the plaintiff as his agent to purchase
the farm and personal property :from Mr. BowInan, and that the employment falls squarely within the letter of the statute. The trans,action relating to the purchase of the farm and of the
personal property was, however, fully executed,
and the plaintiff is not suing the defendant to
enf'orce a ·contract relating to the purch,ase or
sale of re'al es tate. What the pl1aintiff is seeking
by this action is to eompel the defiendant to
comply with his agreernent which agreement was
not prohibited by statute. That part of the agreement relating to the personal property was not
prohibited by the statut~e, and the only re~ason
1

9
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p1aintiff woul'd not be p·ermitted to enforce the
:same in :an action at law· in case tJhe transaction
Telating to the real est;te had remained executory-that is had not been fully executed-would
be because it was an inseparable part of the
original employment to purchase the farm from
Mr. Bowman. When the agreement relating to the
purchase of the farm had become fully executed,
however, illien there was no longer any legal
obstacle in the Wlay which would prevent the plaintiff from eompelling the defendant to account
for the per,sonal property he liad received from
Mr. Bowman in excess of the $300, which was the
amount of his compensation, all of which he had
reeeived and retained . . . ''
The opinion cites the following authorities, all proceeding upon the theory that the statute of frauds has
n·o application to fully executed contracts, and that matteTs arising out of executed contracts may be enforced:
Eastham vs. Anderson, 119 Mass. 526; Remington vs.
Palmer, 62 N.Y. 31; Worden ·vs. Sharp, 56 ill. 104; Root
vs. Burt, 118 Mass. 521; Reytnan vs. Mosher, 71 Ind.596:
Winters vs. Cherry, 78 M-o. 344; Jl erri1nan vs. Tkompson, 48 Wash. 500, 93 Pac. 1075, Orr vs. Perky Invt. Co.,
65 Wash. 281, 118 Pac. 19, and Stewart vs. Preston, 77
Wash. 559, 137 Pac. 993.
The expre'Ssion '• fully executed'' perhaps needs
som·e attention. Obviously, the court in Kerr vs. Hillyard did not 1nean H1-a.t the oral agreement between
pl1aintiff and defendant had been fully executed by defendant. If it had, there 'vould have be·en no lawsuit.
F,oT, althougfu· plaintiff did all th1at "~as requiretl of him
10
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under the ag-reernent, by executing the tr~ans~action with
Bo\v1nan, defendant had failed to perform his agreement that plaintiff should receive the personal property
in ex.cess of $300 in ¥alue.
In the case no\v before this cou~t, plaintiffs have
perform~ed all that 'vas required of them under the oral
agreen1ent, by executing the transaction \vith Granger's,
as a result of which defendants received their ag-re.ed
co1npens~ation. But de£endants have fail,ed t o perform
their promise that they would, in return, make available
for plaintif£s certain sums of cash.
1

The court in Kerr v. Hillyard was invoking the
principle declared in Williston on Contracts (Revised
Edition), vol. II, pp. 1539-40, at §532:
''lt may also be supposed that every part
of the contract which is obnoxious to th~e Statute
has been performed. Under these circumstanc~es
even though a contract is not properly termed divisible, the promise for the remaining perforntance may be enforced. (Citing many authioritie1s.) ''
This general proposition is s·et forth in the Restatement -of Contracts, as. follows:

§219. ''If all pr.omises in a eon'tract \Vhich
are within tJhe Statute ~are fully performed the
performance has .the same legal operation as if
the Statute had be·en satisfied.''
§221. ''Where a contract ·consists of one or
more promises unenforceable because of the
Statute, and one 'Or more promises which a:ve not
within it, the latter are unenforceable so long as
11
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the former remain unperformed or unenforceable
but no longer; ... ''
''·Comment:
''a. The S·ection relates to .eontracts which
contain promises that in thems~elves were from
the 'Outset n'Ot within the terms of the Statute
but ·had coupled with them a.s part of the same'
contract other terms which were within the Statute. As a .contract is an entirety, it is generally
true that none of its provisions ·are enforceable
while part ~are unenforceable, but since non-compliance wi'th the S'tatute does not prevent the
eristence of a contract, it is true not only that
when all promises within the Statute have been
performed the objection disappears, but that if
the party entitled to the benefit of performance
of such promises is willing to have that portion
of the contract abandoned, he may do so ... ''
In ·the instant case, as in Kerr vs. Hillyard, the only
promise's unperfoT111ed are promises relating to personalty (money). The promises relating to realty and t<>
the agents' compensa!tion, required by the statute to be
in writing, were completely performed.
It has been argued by defendants here that the
decision in J( err ·vs. Hillyard turns upon, and is only
justifie·d by, fl"~aud on the part of the defendant. But
a careful ex.anrination of the opinion furnishes no basis
£or such a ·conclusioil-in fact the ter1n '~fraud" does not
even app~ear in the hea.dnotes to the case. Rather, the
court based its ·derision solely upon the fact that pl~ain
tiff ~had fully execut·ed the Ol'~al agreement. The oont:r~olling l•a"\\r is ·a rule of con.fracfs-not of tor·ts.

12
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Corbin on Contracts (1950 ed.) states the rule as
fr01lows, at v.ol. 2, p. 107, §308 :
•'Perjor1nance by the Plaintiff may Make the
Defendant's Ora.l Promise Enforceable.

·'There are numerous cas·es in which it has
been held that if the plaintiff has fully or partly
performed his part as provided in a new oral
agreement, varying the performance required by
a pri~or written contract, ·such pe:rformanee by
the plaintiff will make the new oral agre'ement
enf,oreerable agiainst the other party, even though
he too may have promised something different
from what the written contract required of him.
It n1ay, as the courts are inclirred to say, 'take the
oral contract out of the statute.' In cases where
this is tru~e, the rights rand duti~es of the p·arti:e:S
are, ,after the substituted performance by the
pLaintiff, 1uholly deter1nined by the oral agreement so far a.s that differed from the written one,
and 'tihe written contract is effectively discha:rged
pro tanto. [Citing Hogan vs. Swayz'e, 65 Utah
380, 237 P. 1097 (1925).]"
And at ;pp. 124-8, §313 :

"

"(1) A contraet may consist

~of

,a single
promise for an exe~cuted considel'lation. Tille
promise may be within the s:tatute; but it is certain t'hat the execution of the consider~a tron is
not, f.or the statute m~e.rely prohibits the enf.olf·cement of a contract and this is properly ap,pliCiable
only to executory promises. If the single executory promise is not itself within the statute, it
is enforceable; this 'lS true even though the contract was originally bilateral' bu.t has become unilateral through full performance of the one prom-

13·
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ise that was within the statute by r~e,ason of the
character of the performance promised.
'' [W,here executory promise is within the
~statute].

'' ( 2) A contr:act may consist of two p:r~omises
·b y A (or one promise of two sepaiDate performance's ) for ~an executed consideration, one of the
promises being within the statute while the other
if rt st01od alone, would not be. Thus, for $100
paid by B, A JroOmises B to answer :for the defiault of C and also to make an audit of C's aecounts. In such a case, B should be able to enf-orce
the promise of an audit. The consideration for
the two promises is one undivided sum, and the
contract is called an (entire' contract. But the
purpose .o f tlhe statute is fully attained if A is
prortect·ed from having to pay for the default of
C ; and since A has received the entire co-nsideration for both promises, it is not unjust to compel
him to perfor1n one of them or to pay da'Yflages.

' 'In cases of this sort the courts often call
the contract a divisible contract; but all that the
facts justify is a staoo1nent that the defendant
has promised t·wo perfor1nan,ces that can easily
be distinguished a1~d separated by the court by
refer,ence to the agree1nent itself. The contract is
not divisible in th~ sense that the plaintiff has
given or promised to give a. separate anti distinct
equiVralent for each .o f the t'vo performances
promi~s~ed by the defend.ant. ''
THE ORAL MODIFICATION WAS ACTED UPON
AND IT MAY BE ENFORCED, IN ORDER TO AVOID AN
INEQUITABLE RESULT.
2.

T·h e rel,ated principle N1at an oral1nodifieation which
14
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has been acted upon is valid, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, is established in Utah in Bamberger Co.,
et al vs. Certified Productions, Inc., et al, 88 Utah 194,
48 P2d 489, affirmed on rehearing 88 Utah 213, 53 P2d
1153, ( 1935). S·ee also the ~annotation 'at 118 A.L.R. 1511,
citing this ease in suppo~t ·of this proposition.
In that ea'Se plaintiffs and the assignor ·of the co'rporate defrendant entered into a written lease for the
letting of certain premises on Main Street in S~alt lia~e
City, £or a period of ten years. Subsequently tll'ere were
supplemental oral agreements to forego rent for a certain period pending the m·aking of required alteTiations,
which agreements modified the original leas~e. Thes'e
ag:veement~s were acted upon ·by the corporate defendant,
which materially eh~anged its position in relianee upon
them. Plaintiffs sued for restitution under the 'original
lease, and when the corporate defendant rai'S'ed the oral
agreements as ~a defen·se, plaintiffs ·cl~aimed that ~an oral
modification of a written lease requir·ed by the statute
of frauds 'io be in writing is invalid. The court, spe·aking through M'r. Justice Wrolfe, refuted thi'S contention,
stating 'at 48 P2d 491:
''. . . As a broad general doctrine, it may be
announced that a contract required by the st1atute
of frauds to be in writing cannot be modifie<l by
a :subsequent oral agreement. At the moment the
principle is ·thus announced, it is immedi·ately
subject to many and varied excep:tions. The first
great division comes between executory and .executed modifications . . ''

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And at 48 P2d 492 :

"It rs claimed by the corporate de£endJant in
tills ·cas•e tha:t the modified part of the contract
was by it performed. Consequently we may procee'd immediately to ·a consideration as to whether
'an OJ.'!al modification which ·has- been acted upon.
is valid. Here 1again, there is a division of authority. The note in A.L.R. cites in the United States,
Cali:Dornia, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Milssissippi, Nebr·aska, New York, North Oarol.ina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin, ~as states in which it has been held th!at where
~an agreement as modified has been acted upon
the rights ·of the parties are to be determined
by the modified agreement. As stated by Mr.
J u~stice Oardozo, then justice of tlhe Court of
Appeals of New York, in Imperator Realty Co.
vs. Tull, 228 N.Y. ±47, 127 N.E. 263, 266: 'Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver . . .
We need not go into the question of the accuracy
.of ~tfu.e description . . . The truth is that we are
·fiacing a principle more nearly ultimate than
either waiver or estoppel, one 'vith roots in fue
yet l arger prin·ciple that no one shall be permitte·d to found any claim upon his own inequity or
·take advantage of his O\Yn \Yrong . . . The statute of frauds "'as not intended to offer an asylum
of es0ap·e fron1 that fundan1ental principle of
justice.'
1

1
' ' ' \ t>

aeeept tl1is principle. If a pa.rty has
.changed his position by perfor1ning an oral m~
fieation so that it 'vould be inequitable t o pernnt
the dther party to found a. cl1aim up:on t~he original
agre•en1eut as unn1odified or defeat tl1e former's
clain1 by setting up a d~efense that perfor1nance
1
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was not according to the written cont~act, after
he has induced~ or c;ousented 'to the former going
forward, the modified agreement should be held
valid. We have held in Kerr vs. Hillyard, 51 Utah,
364, 170 P. 981, that ·a contract required to be in
writing wlhen fully executed is not within the
statute of frauds, although originally oral. Logically, an oral modification of a contract required
to be in writing when such modification is fully
executed is taken out of the st.atute. ''
In the instant ease plaintiffs made and fully per~ormed ·the oTal modification, p.ur.suant to d:e£endants'
representations and inducementS'. They materially and
irrevocably changed their position tlhereby, resulting
in material benefit to defendants, :to whiC'h benefit defendants otherwise w:ould not have been entitled.
3. DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE
STATUTE.

Such circumstances ·comprise ffi'O'st of the elements
of equitable estoppel, which would constitute an entirely
separate and independent ba,sis of opposition to rthe statute. Remaining 'elements of es'toppel are present in
this case.
Es,toppel was di'scussed in Kelly vs. Richards, 95
Utah 560, 83 P2d 731 (1938):
"It is essential therefore that the representation, whether it arises by words, acts or conduct, must have been of a material fact; that it
must have been willfully intended to le'ad the party
setting up the estoppel to act upon it or that there
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must have been reasonable grounds and cause to
think that because thereof he would change his
position or do some act or take some course on
faith in the conduct, and that such action results
to his detriment if the person sought to be estopped may now repudiate the words or interpretation
placed upon such conduct. This does not require
an actual intent to defraud but only that the circumstances and conduct were such as would perpetrate a fraud or ·unfair advantage if the party
could now deny what he had induced or suffered
another to believe and act upon. It is an essential
element of estoppel in pais that the person involving it relied upon the representation or conduct of the other party, was influenced in his
own conduct by it, and would not have acted as
he did but for the acts of which he now complains.
If complainant's act appears to be the result of
his own will or judgment, if it does not appear
to be the proximate result of the conduct or representations of the adverse party, there is no estoppel. The conduct 1nust of itself have been sufficient to warrant or induce the course of conduct
by the party seeking to invoke estoppel and it must
have been made for the purpose of inducing such
response and action by the con1plainant. We do
not mean that these are all the elements, nor that
in every case all n1ust eo-exist equally but some
of these elen~e·uts 1nust be present in every estoppel.'-'
As no reply to tht~ answ·er in the instant ca.se was
ordered by the eourt, sueh bar to assertion of the statute
has not appeared in the pleadings, but it is available, notwithstanding, under our present procedure. lT.R.C.P.,
Rules 7(a), 8(c), (d). In any eYent. plaintiffs 1nay obtain
18
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the relief to which they are shown to be entitled under the
proofs received in the action. U.R.C.. P., Rule 54( c) (1).
Defendant.s here misrepresented a material fact, i.e.,
that Carter knew that they could sell the Granger contract
for $4,000 and make .available to plaintiffs an $8,600
F.H.A. loan. (D. 14, 15, 16, 27, 36). It may readily be
inferred that Carter did not know this.
It has been argued that plaintiffs had knowledge
of the real fact, but there is nothing in the record to show
they were aware that Carter did not have the knowledge
he professed to have in regard to the finances. Plaintiffs'
knowledge that the money must come from others is not
knowledge that the money would not be available. Carter
told them that he knew it could be done, and they believed
him. (D. 14, 27, 34). At page 27, lines 5 through 25, of the
desposition appears the following:

"Q. Did you suppose, then, that $8,600 that you
hoped to get on refinancing your new home
would be based upon F.H.A. app·roval ~
A.

That is what we were informed it would be,
yes.

Q.

And you understood that from the beginning?

A.

That is what they told us they could do it for.

You see, what happened, on April 28th-Mr.
Carter presented it that night - that with the
contract money of $4,000 and with the house financed for $8,600, people who are brokers themselves told us what we would obtain would be
enough to meet our debt.s. That was the figure
he had assured us he could do-that was the

19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

figure he promised us he would able to do, he
assured us, because we were worried.
We asked him a number of times if he was
sure, and if he wasn't, the way things stand, it
would be better not to sell the house.
Be better if we had just given them $500. But
he promised. As a matter of fact, as I recall, he
phoned Mr. Wood that night to verify the deal to
us,- that it would go."
Defendants intended that this representation be
acted upon by plaintiffs, inducing them to change their
position. (D. 14, 27, 36, 37). Xo intent to defraud is required in order to set up an estoppel. Kelly v. Richards,
supra. Plaintiffs materially and irrevocably changed
their position, in reliance. (D. 10, 11, 32, 3'7, 43). They
h·ave been damaged and defendants have received unfair
advantage, as a result. (R. 2, 3; D. 11, 37).
C. DEFENDANTS ASSUMED THE RISK THAT PERFORMANCE MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE.

Does the impossibility of performance b~~ defendants
discharge the oral agreement!
The risk that a pron1ised performance may be impossible, because of existing or supervening circumstances, may be assun1ed by the pro1nissor.
In Williston on Contracts (Revised Student Edition}
908, §1934, it is stated:
''A pronl·i.se hnpossible of perform,ance may be
binditng.
20
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"'A man may contract that a future event
shall come to pass over which he has no, or only
limited, power.' Sage v. Hampe, 235 U.S. 99, 104,
35 S. Ct. 94, 59 A. Ed. 147. 'If the occurrence of
an event which is not within human control is in
term.s promised, the words are interpreted as a
promise to be answerable for proximate harm
unless the event occurs.' Rest., Contracts, §457,
Comment b. Not only may such a promise be binding in case of supervening impossibility but it
also may be binding though performance was impossible when the promise was made. Indeed, such
promises are common .... "
The risk of impossibility was assumed by defendants
here; as is stated .at page 27 of the deposition, quoted
supra, and at page.s 15 and 16 of the deposition, as
follows:
"Q.

Now, knowing that he was not in the finance
business, did you suppose that Mr. ~c·arter
could guarantee that he would be .able to sell
the equity that you had in the contract for any
specific sum~

A.

He assured us he could. He said there was
no worry.

Q.

I didn't ask you quite that question. I asked
you if you believed, knowing that he was not
in the finance business, but that he was a
house salesman, did you believe at that time
that he could guarantee to sell the equity that
you had in a contract for any particular sum?

A.

Yes, we took his word for it.
21
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Q. Now, Mr. Welchman, as a man familiar with
the building trade let me state my question
carefully again to you-This is a court proceeding, under oath.
Did you believe at that time that this defendant real estate salesman could guarantee
to you to sell the equity that you had in a
contract for any particular or specified sum f

A.

Yes, it being the fact that at the time I knew
nothing about the contracts, I took his word
for it, yes.

Q.

You believed, then, that this real estate salesman could guarantee to you a certain sum?

A. He did guarantee to me a certain su.m.
Q.

And you believed he could get that exact sum
for the contract~

A.

A few hundred either way, I wouldn't have
cared.

Q.

You did not then believe that he could get a
certain sum-I mean, the exact sum yon have
testified, $4,000, - did you believe he could
get that sum~

A.

That is the figure he said to me.'~

As Carter did not 1nanifest his intention ambiguously, plaintiff Arnell \Y.elch1nan's belief that he might
get "a few hundred either "yayH is inuuaterial. Restatement of C·ontracts, §233.

If, notwithstanding the foregoing, the oral agreelnent is held to be void or unenforceable, are defendants
entitled to retain the con1mission paid b)~ plaintiffs'
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The Restatement of Contracts provides :
"§468. Rights of Restitution:
"(2) Except where a contract clearly provides otherwise, a p.arty thereto who has rendered
performance for which the other party is excused
by impossibility from rendering the agreed exchange, can get judgment for the value of what
he has rendered, less the value of what he has
received, unless what he has rendered can be and
is returned to him in specie within a reasonable
time."
"Comment on Subsection (2) :
"b. This Subsection states the rule where the
plaintiff's performance is not excused by impossibility. The plaintiff may have performed only in
part or he may have fully performed. In either
case the defendant's duty to render return p,erformance has been excused by impossibility or
by the frustration of the object of the contract.
The rule governing the discharge of one p.arty to
a bilateral contract where the other party fails
to perform, whether that failure is due to impossibility or to misconduct is stated in §27 4....
§274. Failure of Consideration as a Discharge of Duty
"(1) In promises for an agreed exchange,
any material failure of performance by one party
not justified by the conduct of the other discharges
the latter's duty to give the agreed exchange even
though his promise is not in terms conditional.
An immaterial failure does not operate as such a
discharge.
"(2) The rule of Subsection (1) is applicable
though the failure of performance is not a viola·
tion of legal duty.
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"Comment:
"a. The reason for the rules in this and the
following sections of this Topic is failure of consideration. Failure of consideration is a generic
expression covering every ca.se where an exchange
of values is to be made and the exchange does not
take place, either because of the fault of a party
or without his fault. In any such case a party
who has not himself caused the failure of consideration by a breach of duty, may refrain from giving
any part of the exchange, which he has not yet
given, and generally may reclaim what he has
given, or its value.
"b. Consideration, as used in the phrase,
failure of consideration, means merely an exchange in fact agreed upon. Failure of consideration, therefore, is failure to receive such an exchange. In the formation of contracts, consideration is the exchange for a promise ( §75). In the
present connection the consideration in question is
the promised performance of one party agreed
to be exchanged for that of the other.
"Comment on Subsection (2) :
"c. The law excuses a contracting party
from perfonning his pronrise for a variety of
reasons - infancy, insanity, in1possibility caused
in certain ways; but hozce,ver blarneless in law
and fact a party to a contract may be in failing
to perfor1n his pro1uise, £f he does fail he should
not have u·hnt i.s pron1i,sed tn ea:clu1nge for his
perfornzance."
~.eo

the san1e ~ffpet see ,V.illiston on
§1969 and following.

Contracts~

supra,
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It is not enough that plaintiffs here received so1ne
legal consideration in return for their promises and acts,
if they did not receive the consideration bargained for
and promised, without the pron1ise of which they would
have made no contract at all, either with defendants or
with Granger's. (D. 37).

There is ample support in the record to establish
a case that-will-survive a motion for summary judgment.

-4.

new contract was entered into by the parties on
April 28, 1956, which modified and, to the extent of such
modification, replaced the original written contract of
March 8, 1956.
Such new' agreement conferred enforceable contractual rights upon plaintiffs, notwithstanding the statute
of frauds, for several, independent, reasons, to-wit:
( 1)

All provisions within the statute were fully

executed.
(2) Plaintiffs made and fully performed the oral
modification, pursuant to defendants' representations .and
inducements, materially and irrevocably changing their
position thereby, and thereby conferring upon defendants benefits to which they otherwise would not have
been entitled.
(3)

Defendants are estopped to assert the statute.
25
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The risk of impossibility of peTformance by defendants was expressly assumed by them. The agreement was
not discharged thereby.
In fact and law, plaintiffs are entitled to damage.s for
breach of contract.
But, in any event, they are, at the least, entitled
to restitution of the commission they paid to defendants.
We respectfully submit that the summary judgment
should be vacated.

VICTOR A. SPENCER
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Appellants

26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

